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I.   Introduction 
 
NYU Law’s symposium “From Rights to Reality: Mobilizing for Human Rights and Its 
Intersection with International Law” has been a valuable opportunity to reflect on the role that 
international law has played in the furtherance of human rights around the world over the past six 
decades.  It has also been a stimulating forum to assess the state of our knowledge, experience, 
and research relating to the development of human rights law and its application in various 
settings around the world.  The scholars and practitioners participating in this symposium have 
each made remarkable contributions to the development, interpretation, and application of 
human rights law internationally, and I am very grateful that they have taken the time to engage 
the arguments and evidence in Mobilizing for Human Rights.
1  The editors of the Journal of 
International Law and Politics are to be congratulated on a stimulating symposium and a 
valuable volume.   
In this concluding article, I will describe what Mobilizing for Human Rights set out to do, 
what I think it did well, and what it did not, in the end, accomplish.  There is much to mention on 
both scores.  While the book was one of the first comprehensive efforts to theorize and test 
empirically the effects of international legal agreements on a broad range of rights indicators, the 
research necessarily fails to speak to some issues, raises additional questions, and opens up new 
avenues for empirical research.  I will also engage the observations of my colleagues in the 
symposium, whose supportive as well as skeptical views I very much appreciate.  I hope to make 
clearer how the research potentially connects with strategies for rights improvements.  I conclude 
on a very humble note: the experience represented by the symposium participants far outstrips 
the scholarly findings of the book, but I am hopeful that discussion of the kind we have had leads 
both to better scholarship and broadly informed practice.   
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1BETH A SIMMONS, Mobilizing for human rights : international law in domestic politics   (Cambridge University 
Press. 2009). II.  Mobilizing for Human Rights – Goals and Accomplishments 
The millennium seemed an appropriate time for stock-taking with respect to the 
international law of human rights.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights had passed its 
half-century anniversary.  The two most sweeping human rights treaties in history – the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights – were approaching theirs.  The density of binding treaties, 
declarations and a growing body of law representing best practices relating to human rights had 
been on the rise for decades, as Figure 1 indicates.   
 
Figure 1: 
 
Source: United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm.  “Other” 
includes a wide range of nonbinding instruments, such as 
proclamations, understandings, principles, safeguards, guidelines, 
recommendations and codes of conduct. 
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 ﾠBut to what end?  Did this development really herald an age of rights with real 
improvements that individuals and groups could realize, or did it signal the development of legal 
structures that served only to distract from the problems of humankind?
2   Was this another 
instance in which international law had simply over-promised, raised hopes, but failed to 
deliver?  Did it allow states to carry on as they always had – trampling rights wherever necessary 
to retain their power and prerogative?
3 
When I began research for Mobilizing for Human Rights in 2001, there was almost no 
quantitative empirical research on human rights practices around the world.  In political science 
and international relations, there was a burgeoning qualitative research program on the spread of 
human rights norms internationally.
4  Interestingly, however, legal norms were rarely considered 
explicitly in the human rights social science literature of the 1990s and 2000s.  Legal scholars 
had long been concerned with the impact of law on practice, and their writing reflects both their 
research as well as their remarkable range of experience.
5  It was hard to know, however, 
whether many of their insights could be generalized in a rigorous way. 
But what was largely missing was a systematic empirical study about the effects of 
international law on a broad range of human rights practices.  New tools and resources were 
becoming available to tackle this question with fresh evidence and methods.  The United Nations 
had just started posting on their website the status of human rights treaty ratifications, 
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs).
6  Systematic, standardized accounts of 
human rights practices for nearly all states around the world were increasingly available in a very 
convenient format, from Amnesty International
7 and the United States State Department.
8  Even 
Freedom House, which had devised seat-of-the-pants assessment of civil liberties and political 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2 See DAVID KENNEDY, The dark sides of virtue : reassessing international humanitarianism   (Princeton University 
Press. 2004). 
3 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, The limits of International law   (Oxford University Press. 2005). 
4 See generally THOMAS RISSE, et al., The power of human rights : international norms and domestic change   
(Cambridge University Press. 1999);KATHRYN SIKKINK, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty 
in Latin America, 47 International Organization (1993);MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, Activists beyond 
borders : advocacy networks in international politics   (Cornell University Press. 1998);DAVID P. FORSYTHE, The 
internationalization of human rights   (Lexington Books. 1991);SALLY ENGLE MERRY, Human rights and gender 
violence : translating international law into local justice   (University of Chicago Press. 2006). THE POWER OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS:  INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999); Kathryn 
Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993). 
5 See generally THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 
2000); LOUIS HENKIN, The age of rights   (Columbia University Press. 1990).; STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. 
ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG 
LEGACY(2001); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 
IND. L.J.1397 (1999). 
6  Up to date information on the status of human rights treaty ratification can be found at Ch. IV:  Human Rights, 
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited Jan. 26, 
2012). 
7 Human Rights by Country, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights/human-rights-by-
country(last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
8 Human Rights Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). rights since the 1970s, was starting to justify and systematize their “civil liberties” and “political 
rights” ratings, allowing for a look under the hood at how they were arriving at their very 
influential judgments.
9 The United Nations was beginning to collect interesting and usable data 
on such things as women’s access to education, employment and certain kinds of health care.
10 
Scholars and practitioners alike were hungry for a way to summarize trends over time and 
across a large number of cases.  Several of the former launched major efforts to code (i.e., assign 
numbers to) the growing trove of descriptive and quantitative material that had been collated by 
these sources.  The possibilities for systematic statistical analyses of international human rights 
were most definitely on the rise.  The time seemed right for a study that drew on and contributed 
to these resources to piece together a picture of how international law has influenced practice.  
Mobilizing for Human Rights was hardly, however, the first effort to analyze 
quantitatively the relationship between the ratification of human rights treaties and actual human 
rights outcomes.  One of the first efforts to link an international treaty with outcomes using 
quantitative methods was Linda Camp-Keith’s research on the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.
11  Oona Hathaway’s path-breaking research and especially her careful 
creation of indicators for torture and for fair trials broke new ground and attracted much 
dismayed attention from the scholarly legal profession.
12  Neither of these important works came 
to the conclusion that international human rights treaties have had a positive impact on the 
countries that have ratified them. 
Perhaps the problem was an underdeveloped theory of the conditions under which we 
might expect human rights treaties to influence state behavior and other human rights outcomes.  
It seemed to me that internationally, realists were correct when they asserted that no state had a 
real interest in enforcing human rights within the jurisdiction of other states.
13  However, 
systematic accounts were hardly the end of the theoretical possibilities.  Those actors with the 
most at stake might very well be expected to organize, to mobilize to demand the rights 
contained in treaties their governments ratified under certain conditions.  The actors were likely 
to be domestic, and they would be most likely to organize to demand their rights where there was 
some probability these rights might be realized through their action.  On the one hand, in highly 
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9 For access to historical systematized data, see Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data, FREEDOM 
HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
10 For the latest version of such statistics, see Statistics and Information on Men and Women, U.N. STATISTICS 
DIV.,http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
11 LINDA CAMP KEITH, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a 
Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 Journal of Peace Research (1999).  One of the earliest book-length 
research projectsto use quantitative evidence linking treaty ratification with human rights outcomes was TODD 
LANDMAN, Protecting human rights : a comparative study   (Georgetown University Press. 2005). 
12 See OONA HATHAWAY, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale Law Journal (2002). 
13 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner write, for example, that “nations are not generally inclined to expend military and 
economic resources to prevent another nation from abusing its citizens.” JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A POSNER, 
Understanding the Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 639(2000). democratic states, citizens have the means to be heard; by definition, they live in responsive 
regimes.  But they also have a good many rights in place, especially political rights, so they are 
not likely to be strongly motivated to demand additional rights.  On the other hand, in autocratic 
regimes, human rights treaties are hugely motivating, but the chances of political action ending 
in success are remote; think Tiananmen Square.  In short: mobilization and, hence, political 
demands are unlikely to be operative in either stable democracies (where there is no motive) or 
stable autocracies (where there is really no means to influence the regime by political or social 
mobilization).  There are clear reasons therefore to expect human rights treaties to have varying 
effects in different kinds of regimes, based on the expected value of mobilization of local 
stakeholders.  
What the book set out to do was to explore the plausibility of this claim, and to show that 
international human rights treaties have positive consequences, at least in fluid, transitional 
regimes where the future is up for grabs and there is some hope for shaping new values and 
institutions.  So one of the book’s major contributions was to examine rights impacts in different 
kinds of political, social and legal settings; from democracies to autocracies, from settings 
characterized by strong rule of law to those without, from secular to officially religious polities. 
A second contribution was the explicitly comparative look at different kinds of human rights.  I 
tried to address the effects of international treaties across a range of issue areas, from civil and 
political rights to torture; from women’s rights to those of children.
14  A third contribution was 
methodological.  Broad correlations were established using statistical methods.  But since many 
of the processes implied by the correlations can only be evaluated through case studies, I 
included detailed analyses of mobilization to stop torture in Chile
15 and Israel
16 and mobilization 
in Japan
17 and Colombia
18 to address women’s rights.  No one indicator, no one estimation, no 
one story, nails the case that international law has contributed to human rights improvements on 
average in many parts of the world.  Together, however, the evidence that ratified treaties matter 
for rights on the ground is pretty compelling.  
“Pretty compelling” is hardly the last word, of course.  There is a tremendous amount of 
research yet to do to fully appreciate the connections between law and outcomes.  Many of the 
contributions to the symposium and to this volume point to fruitful ways to push the research 
agenda forward.  Geoff Dancy and Kathryn Sikkink’s contribution to the symposium and to this 
volume is an excellent example.  Their research demonstrates quite convincingly that specific 
treaty commitments are associated with much more domestic human rights litigation.
19   Kathryn 
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14  Multiple indicators were employed for each of these areas (with the exception of torture).  These included fair 
trials, freedom of religion and the death penalty (civil and political rights); freedom from torture; the ratio of girls to 
boys in elementary schools, the ratio of women to men in public employment, and access to modern forms of 
reproductive health care (women’s rights); the prevalence of child labor, child soldiers and immunizations 
(children’s rights).   
15 SIMMONS., supra note 1, at 285–96. 
16 Id. at. 296–304. 
17 Id. at. 237–45. 
18 Id. at. 245–53. 
19 See generally Geoff Dancy & Kathryn Sikkink, Ratification and Human Rights Prosecutions: Sikkink’s and Hunjoon Kim’s earlier work confirms the link between domestic human rights 
litigation and improved rights outcomes.
20  This is an example of highly productive scholarship 
that explores the precise range of mechanisms by which treaties can be expected to influence 
human rights on the ground.  
Mobilizing for Human Rights was in many ways a conservative piece of research.  It 
focused on traditional interpretations of specific treaty provisions, and looked for “obvious” 
effects in ratifying countries.  Many of the participants in the Symposium noted that this is quite 
a limited test of the impact of international law on human rights.  For example, Catharine 
MacKinnon noted that gender crime fits the book’s framework, but cuts across treaties.  
MacKinnon suggested that the question—why commit?—could be asked of men generally in the 
area of gender crime.  Why do men cede “sovereignty” over their women to other men?  Her 
contribution to the symposium pushes much harder than I did to problematize whether men even 
understood upon ratification that international human law would come to address various gender 
crimes.  More could be done, Catharine MacKinnon noted, to explore the effect of international 
law on perceptions of “legitimate” behavior.  While the data are hard to come by and a different 
method would be necessary (ethnography, in the style of Sally Merry’s persuasive work
21) this is 
an important way forward for understanding international law’s more dynamic effects. 
Every book—even one of 450 pages, testing 118 variables, and providing 30 figures, 24 
tables, and 2 appendices (with 12 more posted online
22)—makes some simplifications, and Ruti 
Teitel’s symposium comments point out one major one made in Mobilizing: the relative neglect 
of regional legal processes, institutions, and values.  I did find that there were strong regional 
influences on the decision to ratify a treaty: the density of ratification within one country’s 
region exerts in many cases a strong positive influence on a government to do so.
23  I also looked 
at the effects of regional treaties addressing torture in Chapter 6, and found that many of the 
patterns associated with the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) had (weaker) echoes at the 
regional level.
24  But Teitel, with good justification, calls for a much more thorough examination 
of the dynamics that operate transnationally at the regional level.  She argued that transnational 
civil society increasingly was appealing to regional courts, after exhausting domestic 
possibilities.  These appeals have had important legal consequences; she cited changes in Chilean 
and Peruvian court rulings, which depended on the earlier rulings of the Inter-American Court 
for Human Rights.  These local cases are part of a dynamic that is continent wide, in Teitel’s 
view.  Attention to rights norms involves not only “international law in domestic politics,” but 
also regional law and transnational actors in domestic courts.  Andrew Moravscik’s symposium 
comments relating to vertical enforcement in the European Union context are similar in this 
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Toward a Transnational Theory of Treaty Compliance, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. XX (2012). 
20 HUNJOON KIM & KATHRYN SIKKINK, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for 
Transitional Countries1, 54 International Studies Quarterly (2010). 
21 See generally MERRY. 
22 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights:  International Law in Domestic Politics, WEATHERHEAD CTR.INT’L 
AFFAIRS (Dec. 2009), http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/4858.  
23 SIMMONS. at 90–96. 
24 Iid. at.at 276–80. regard.  I agree that a more complex model of international law’s influence would include 
regional actors, courts, and processes.  But I also think that regional influences will have a 
significant impact where domestic actors take up the message and add a significant local voice to 
these regional trends. 
 
III. Enduring Puzzles:  Why Ratify International Law? 
The two issues that served most to furrow the brows of our symposium participants are 
these.  First: why do states ratify treaties, when, evidently, they stimulate demands for 
compliance?  Second: why international law?  Why not change constitutions and domestic 
statutes, and are these not capable of mobilizing domestic groups in the same way as 
international treaties? 
Why do states ratify? 
Mobilizing for Human Rights rejected the notion that treaty ratification was utterly 
meaningless.  While many people have emphasized the importance of international costs, the 
theory developed in the book suggested that there were also potentially risks of ratifying human 
rights treaties at the domestic level.  Local citizens, I claimed, would use these treaties under 
certain circumstances, to make demands on their government.  The international relations 
literature refers to “audience costs” as the risk that a government will be punished for taking 
positions, making commitments or staking claims from which they subsequently back down.
25  
These costs are a mechanism for holding governments accountable for their promises.  
Mobilizing for Human Rights develops a theory that assumes these costs may kick in when a 
government ratifies a human rights treaty, and concludes that such ratification is not likely to be 
costless.
26 
Since the publication of the book, I have had the opportunity to do follow up research on 
this question of domestic audience costs.  In surveys administered between 2005 and 2011 in 
both the United States and Colombia, I have sought to determine whether there is any evidence 
that people hold governments accountable for their treaty commitments.  I asked a sample of 
people I would consider well-informed opinion leaders
27 the following question: 
“There is currently a debate about whether the United States [Colombia] should 
tighten rules for interrogating detainees limiting psychological forms of abuse.  
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25 See generally JAMES D FEARON, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs, 41 The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (1997);KENNETH A SCHULTZ, Looking for Audience Costs, 45 The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (2001);MICHAEL TOMZ, Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach, 61 International Organization (2007). 
26 SIMMONS., at 59–64. 
27 Surveys were administered at the University of Illinois (2005) to students and faculty; the Western International 
Studies Association meeting in Pasadena California (2011), at the Northeastern International Studies Association, 
Providence Rhode Island (2011), and the Bi-annual Conference of the Colombian International Relations Network 
(Redintercol), Bogotá, Colombia (2011). These forms of abuse are outlawed by the Convention Against Torture, which 
the U.S. has ratified.  Do you think the U.S. [Colombia] should follow rules 
limiting psychological forms of detainee abuse, even if it makes it more difficult 
to collect intelligence information from them?  Please circle one: Yes, Possibly, 
No, Don’t Know.”
28 
Half of each survey sample randomly received the entire question, and half received the question 
with the bolded italicized sentence removed.  Thus, we can think of exposure to information 
about the fact and nature of the United States [Colombian] commitment under international law 
as the “treatment” in this experiment.   
Figure 2: Responses to the Torture Survey 
A.   “Audience Costs” for United States Respondents: 
 
B.   “Audience Costs” for Columbian Respondents: 
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28  The translation into Spanish, including some modifications to make the question more appropriate to the 
Colombian context, was as follows: “Existe un debate en Colombia sobre si el Estado debere formular las reglas que 
rigen las practicas de interrogacion de los acusodos de crimenes relacionados con el terrorismo y el narcotrafico con 
el fin evitar los tratoscueles o inhumanos, asicomo la tortura. Estos son prohibidos por la convencion contra la 
tortura de la ONU, que Colombia ha ratificado. Pregunta> Cree usted que el Estado colombiano deba aprobar 
medidas para limitar las practicas de interrogacion incluso si ello hace mas dificil recoger infomacion de 
inteligencia?” 
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The results suggest that when people are aware of the existence of an international legal 
commitment, they hold their governments accountable to these commitments.  While the answers 
of the Colombians appear to be a bit more tolerant of torture, in both countries the suggestion of 
an international legal commitment increases by between 11-13% for the United States and 
Colombia, respectively, the share of people who think that their country should follow torture 
norms, even if they help to glean useful intelligence.  This suggests – of course, it does not prove 
– that people care about the nature of the international legal commitments their government 
makes.   Much more could be done to explore the nature and extent of domestic audience costs 
related to international legal obligations. 
One of the continuing puzzles, then, is why governments ratify these agreements in the 
first place, especially if, as the above evidence suggests, domestic actors may hold governments 
accountable for their commitments?  One of the most widespread assumptions – judging from 
passing comments in the literature – is that governments decide to ratify human rights treaties 
because they are offered inducements from the advanced democratic countries to do so.  For 
example, Eric Posner has written that, “Developing states have ratified the treaties for more 
diverse reasons.  Some developing states succumbed to pressure from western states that tied aid 
and other benefits (such as EU membership) to treaty ratification.”
29  Many other scholars have 
made similar assertions.
30  Others emphasize the intangible benefits of ratifying treaties – praise 
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29 ERIC A. POSNER, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 Columbia Law Review (2008). 
30 For example, Oona Hathaway refers to “expressive” benefits, that is, “rewards for positions rather than for 
effects’” HATHAWAY.  She asserts that “Simply put, states join treaties like the Convention against Torture in no 
small part to make themselves look good.  In so doing, they may hope to attract more foreign investment, aid 
donations, international trade, and other tangible benefits.” OONA HATHAWAY, The Promise and Limits of the 
International Law of Torture, in Torture : a collection (Sanford Levinson & Alan M. Dershowitz eds., 2004).  
Similarly, to explain ratification of the Convention Against Torture (CAT), Darren Hawkins and Jay Goodliffe argue 
that “with credibility established by [CAT ratification], other states and third party actors (corporations and NGOs) 
reward that state through investment, trade, aid and positive political relationships.” DARREN HAWKINS & JAY 
GOODLIFFE, Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture, 68 Journal of Politics (2006).  
Similar assertions are made by Bernhard Boockmann and Uta Oberdörster.  BERNHARD BOOCKMANN, The 
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31  Joel 
Trachtman’s “theory of exchange,” by which states who value improved human rights extract 
international legal commitments (e.g., treaty ratification) in exchange for other “valuable 
consideration,”
32 rests entirely on the idea that ratification of human rights treaties would often 
not happen were it not for the willingness of other states to in some way pay off the resistors.  In 
Mobilizing for Human Rights. I found evidence that most countries were sincere ratifiers or non-
ratifiers; for example, democracies tended much more readily to ratify human rights agreements 
than did autocracies.  But there are indeed some cases in which governments with short time 
horizons have ratified agreements with which they likely had little intention to comply.  I 
presented some evidence that autocratic governments were more likely to ratify treaties toward 
the end of their hold on power than were democratic governments, consistent with a theory of 
appeasing a domestic audience for short-term political gain.
33  I also found evidence of a lot of 
regional emulation in ratification behavior, which was especially strong during times and in 
regions in which information was very thin.  I interpreted the evidence to mean that governments 
tended to ratify treaties they favor, but a few copied the behavior of others when they thought 
they could get away with it.  But I never addressed the question of whether states are motivated 
by external rewards for ratification directly.  
In follow-up work I have done with Richard Nielsen, we explicitly tested an exchange 
theory of human rights treaty ratification.
34  We tested a series of empirical models that 
attempted to link ratification of the ICCPR and the CAT with future inflows of foreign direct 
investment, international trade, and (most plausibly) foreign aid.  We found virtually no evidence 
that ratification attracts any of these tangible economic rewards.  That is, we found no 
correlations that are statistically distinguishable from zero effect.  If anything, in the case of 
trade, we found that non-OECD ratifiers tended to experience a drop in their foreign trade with 
the OECD countries after ratification, although this result was statistically significant only for 
ratification of the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol.  We followed up with interviews with 
German
35 and Norwegian
36 aid officials, who confirmed that ratification was never even an 
informal condition for the receipt of foreign aid.  We then looked for evidence that ratifiers 
reaped “intangible” benefits – praise, even a positive comment - from respected peers, regional 
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ratification of ILO conventions: A hazard rate analysis, 13 Economics & Politics (2001). UTA  OBERDÖRSTER, Why 
Ratify? Lessons from Treaty Ratification Campaigns, 61 Vanderbilt Law Review 681-712(2008). 
31 E.g., DARREN HAWKINS, Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights 
Norms, 48 International Studies Quarterly, 793 (2004). 
32 Joel Trachtman, Who Cares About International Human Rights?  The Supply and Demand of International 
Human Rights Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.XX (2012). 
33 SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 88–90. 
34 RICHARD NIELSEN & BETH A  SIMMONS, Rewards for Rights Ratification? Testing for Tangible and Intangible 
Benefits of Human Rights Treaty Ratification  (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451630  2011). 
35 E-mail Correspondence with Peter Rothen, Former Head of the German Foreign Office’s Human Rights Dep’t 
(2003–2008)(Aug. 11, 2009) (on file with author).  
36 Interviews with Anne Marchant, Ambassador, and Geir Løkken, Assistant Director General, Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, in Oslo, Nor. (Aug. 6, 2009). organizations or non-governmental organizations, when they ratify one of these key human 
rights treaties.  Examining the 3,625 daily press briefings given by the Department of State 
between January 2, 1991 and December 23, 2008, we have found that the United States 
Department of State completely ignores ratification of human rights agreements in its public 
statements.  Using 34,335 EU briefings available between 1985 and 2010, we found only very 
weak evidence of slight recognition from the European Union in the case of the Convention 
Against Torture.  Nor did Amnesty International ever pull punches or offer much praise for 
ratifiers.  These findings provide practically no empirical support for an external “exchange” 
model of treaty ratification. 
James Hollyer and Peter Rosendorff offer a domestic explanation that is counter-intuitive, 
to say the least.
37  They argue that repressive states ratify international human rights agreements 
in order to raise their cost of violating the agreement.  Hollyer and Rosendorff argue that some of 
the most repressive states in fact want to bear very high international audience costs for torturing 
their domestic opponents, and violating an agreement such as the Convention Against Torture 
sends a (perverse) signal to their domestic opponents that they are willing to pay high costs to 
keep their opposition down.  This, Hollyer and Rosendorff say, resolves the puzzle as to why 
repressive governments who ratify the CAT in fact torture more than repressive governments 
who do not.
38 
Hollyer and Rosendorff’s Bad Boy theory of ratification has some plausibility problems 
on its face.  It just doesn’t square with other empirical regularities we observe with respect to 
torture.  If their theory was correct – if repressive governments wanted to bear costs for torture – 
they would publicize their exploits; instead, almost all governments, even the worst of the Bad 
Boys, deny they engage in torture.
39  Moreover, if a government really wanted to send an 
unmistakable signal of its “type”, it would just take its opponents out to the public square and 
execute them – television cameras rolling.  Ratifying a treaty hardly seems like much of a signal 
that one is “tough” to one’s political opponents.  But if this mechanism is at work in a few cases, 
it depends on the value and legitimacy that domestic actors place on the treaty that the 
government has ratified, which would provide an answer to those who question the unique value 
of treaty ratification in the first place. 
What is unique about International Law? 
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37 James Hollyer & Peter Rosendorff, Do Human Rights Agreements Prolong the Tenure of Autocratic Ratifiers?, 44 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.XX (2012). 
38 There is only a fraction of a category difference in the average torture score among repressive countries that have 
and have not ratified the CAT.  Among the “stable autocracies” in MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, between 1985 
and 1996 (the years for which Hollyer and Rosendorff test), the difference on Hathaway’s 5-point Torture scale 
averages about .4 of a point.   
39 See, for example, the extensive discussion in STANLEY COHEN, States of denial : knowing about atrocities and 
suffering   (Blackwell Publishers. 2001). Some international law scholars remain puzzled about why a state would want to use 
international law to improve rights, when they have the autonomous ability to create rules to 
protect rights.  Edward Swaine makes this point at great length.  He argues that domestic rules 
can alter agendas, serve as bases for litigation and mobilize groups to demand enforcement, 
noting that constitutional changes, whatever their inspiration, may involve just about as much 
deviation from ordinary politics as treaty ratification.
40  Joel Trachtman’s contribution to this 
volume also puzzles over this question.  He asserts that Mobilizing for Human Rights “fails to 
explain the use of international law to make commitments, by low depth states or by high depth 
states.”
41  He argues that if a state intends to improve its rights, international legal obligations are 
redundant.  If not, they are irrelevant.   
Let’s begin with the “puzzle” of redundancy by states who basically want to respect 
rights (the sincere ratifiers in Mobilizing for Human Rights).  Redundancy is simply not a puzzle, 
least of all for actors interested in developing a robust legal system.  Scholars of public 
administration regard redundancy as “a powerful device for the suppression of error.”
42  
Sociologists of the law interpret redundancy as a legal strength; it permits the communication 
about norms and expectations in a complementary yet consistent manner, ultimately contributing 
to system durability in the case of competing, contradictory demands.
43  Dualist systems are 
premised on the redundancy of international and domestic law, inasmuch as the former are not 
enforceable unless implemented domestically.  In the common law tradition, redundancy is a 
virtue: the more precedents that can be produced, the better.  As Martin Shapiro has written, 
“Legal discourse in the style of stare decisis [itself is] an instance of communication with 
extremely high levels of redundancy.”
44 
Redundancy is found throughout the international human rights regime, yet we hardly 
puzzle over that. The core international human rights agreements in particular have highly 
redundant provisions.
45  And yet, states do not usually substitute the ICCPR for the CEDAW; 
empirically we find that if a state has ratified the former it is likely to ratify the latter as well.   
Hollyer and Rosendorff, as I have noted above, would respond that international human 
rights treaties raise costs of violations – perhaps uniquely so.  But there is no need to go this far. 
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40 Edward T. Swaine, Ersatz Treaties, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.& POL.XX, XX (2012).  
41 Trachtman, supra note 32, at XX (emphasis added). 
42 MARTIN LANDAU, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 Public 
Administration Review (1969). 
43 NIKLAS  LUHMANN, Law As a Social System, 83 Northwestern University Law Review (1988-1989). 
44 MARTIN SHAPIRO, Toward a Theory of "Stare Decisis", 1 The Journal of Legal Studies 125(1972). 
45 To give only a few examples:  “Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of 
the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” is found verbatim in the preambles of the 
ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC (it is paraphrased in the CERD).  A “right to equality” is found in the ICESCR 
(art. 3), ICCPR (art. 3), and the CEDAW (art.2(a)).  A right to vote is found in the CERD (art. 5(c)), CEDAW  (art. 
7(a)), and ICCPR (art.25(b)).  The right to self-determination is included in the ICCPR (art. 1(1)) and ICESCR (art. 
1(1)). Constitutions, statutes and court cases can also affect domestic political debates in crucial ways.  
These are not alternatives, but often the mechanisms through which the norms contained in 
treaties become enmeshed in domestic settings.  Mobilizing for Human Rights looked at direct 
treaty effects in the quantitative tests.  The qualitative tests looked explicitly at the inspiration 
ratified treaties have provided for statutory change and domestic constitutional development.  
These changes in domestic law then become crucial in supporting human rights demands.  The 
case of women’s access to modern forms of reproductive health care in Colombia is an extended 
discussion of just such a case of constitutional law development.
46 
New research has focused on the role that international law plays in inspiring domestic 
legal change, often in the form of implementing legislation.  Thania Sanchez, for example, has 
researched in great detail the extent to which the requirements of the CAT have become 
implemented in the criminal codes of Latin American countries.
47  She finds that ratification of 
the CAT has led to domestic legal change in many but not in all cases 
In follow up work with Tom Ginsburg and Zachary Elkins, we looked carefully at the 
relationship between treaty ratification and the contents of national constitutions.  Based on their 
impressive database of constitutional provisions, we have found that states that have ratified the 
ICCPR for example are much more likely to contain similar provisions than those that have not 
ratified.  This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
To create this figure, we devised an “index of similarity” between the rights contained in 
the ICCPR and each national constitution in existence, using data from the Comparative 
Constitutions Project.
48  Note that the post-1965 constitutions of countries that have ratified the 
ICCPR (in bold face) are in fact much more similar in their rights content than countries that 
have not ratified (in shadow face).  This was corroborated in our empirical model, which found 
that countries that ratified the ICCPR had new constitutions that were much more similar to the 
ICCPR than they had before ratification, and more than was the case for countries who did not 
ratify.
49 
Figure 2: Similarity of National Constitutions to the ICCPR 
(Comparison of ICCPR Ratifiers and Non-Ratifiers) 
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46 SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 245–53. 
47 Sanchez, forthcoming. 
48 The Comparative Constitutions project identified 801 unique constitutional systems since 1789.  As of this 
analysis, data had been gathered on roughly 2/3 of these cases.  The sample for the present chapter includes 549 of 
the world’s 801 constitutions written during this period.  Most countries of the world now have a document 
identified as a constitution integrated into a single document.  For a small number of countries (Israel for example), 
we rely on a series of documents that form the highest normative level in the legal system.  We exclude the United 
Kingdom entirely from our analysis.  For more on the project see http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/.  
49 ZACHARY ELKINS, et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights 
Practice in the Late Twentieth Century  (2010).  
Source:  Elkins, Ginsburg and Simmons (2011).  Based on data from the Comparative 
Constitutions Project, 2011 (http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/) 
 
We hypothesized, consistent with communications theories that emphasize the usefulness 
of redundancy in message transmission, that “If legal and treaty obligations are signals, 
presumably the intensity of the signal increases with the number of iterations of it.  Thus 
adopting a norm at both the international and domestic levels reinforces the strength of the signal 
to the relevant audiences.”
50  Furthermore, we found that, indeed, there are three distinct 
channels for improved human rights outcomes: treaty ratification, constitutional provisions and 
treaty ratification mediated by constitutional provisions.  We concluded that, “. . . while both 
treaties and constitutions exert their own direct influence on compliance, there also appears to be 
a mediating effect of constitutions on actual rights protection.  One way in which international 
norms work is through adoption in national constitutional texts.  This result is consistent with a 
theory that constitutions and international treaties supplement each other in terms of enforcement 
mechanisms.  Adoption of a norm at both levels increases the probability that the norm will 
actually be enforced, because it provides multiple monitors and alternative forums in which to 
challenge government behavior.”
51 
In short, I do not dispute Edward Swaine’s point that “states may in theory be jump-
started by the appearance on the international scene of a negotiated treaty regardless of whether 
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50 Id. at. 
51 Id. at 22. 
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6it is one they themselves have ratified.”
52  But the data suggest that treaties both have an 
independent “jump start” effect, and inspire constitutional innovations that appear to have 
similar consequences. 
 
IV.  Conclusion:  Mobilizing for Human Rights in Perspective 
This symposium has pushed hard on the idea that international human rights law has 
mattered much to the status actual human rights practice around the world.  Much to their credit 
social scientists have started to take seriously and to explore mechanisms behind the claim that 
international law constrains various kinds of state behavior.  Even more to their credit, legal 
scholars have grappled with the trend toward quantitative empirical research, and sought to 
understand both its potential and its limitations.  Philip Allston’s contribution to the symposium 
is very useful in this regard: numbers can be biased, even wrong.  I would add, even when they 
are reasonably accurate – or even when we try to correct their biases with statistical means – they 
can only take us so far.  Social science theorists and statistically oriented researchers will always 
need experienced voices to tell us whether our theories and findings bear any resemblance to the 
real world.  For the most part, the claims made in Mobilizing for Human Rights ring true for 
those who have worked hard toward treaty implementation.  One reaction to the claims in the 
book has been that I have been pushing on an open door for the past decade. 
Where do we go from here?  When Eric Posner complains that the empirical work was 
done only on “a handful of [treaty] provisions,” is he calling for more or for less work of this 
sort?  When he complains of potential bias, claiming that “countries may well be less likely to 
comply with provisions that do not require easily measurable outcomes—precisely because 
observers cannot easily tell whether the state has complied with the treaty term,”
53 is he calling 
for more (and better) empirical research, or for more thought experiments that begin with the 
command, “Suppose. . .”?
54  Mobilizing for Human Rights hardly closes the door on the 
possibilities for empirical work, but what, would Eric Posner and others suggest, is the way 
forward? 
I envision a research agenda that builds on the efforts of scholars such as Kathryn 
Sikkink, Thania Sanchez, Sally Merry, James Vreeland, James Hollyer and Peter Rosendorff and 
others who have inquired into the consequences of treaty ratification at the domestic level.  
Litigation, implementation, and constitutionalization constitute the main cluster of legal 
consequences of interest.  Political competition, (counter) mobilization, and the translation into 
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52 Swaine, supra note 40, at XX.  
53 Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons’ Mobilizing for Human Rights, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL.XX (2012). 
54 In one of his main articles in which Posner outlines his thoughts on the effects of human rights treaties, he asks us 
to “suppose” a series of facts seven times.     See see	 ﾠEric	 ﾠA.	 ﾠPosner,	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠWelfare,	 ﾠNot	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights,	 ﾠ108	 ﾠColum.	 ﾠ
L.	 ﾠRev.	 ﾠ1758	 ﾠ(2008). the local vernacular, to use Merry’s words, constitute some of the main social and political 
consequences.  Scholars have only scratched the surface in understanding how human rights 
treaties create opportunities for mobilization, organization, articulation and competition that 
differs from the counterfactual we might expect in their absence.   
We will also benefit from a variety of research methods.  Two kinds of methods have 
dominated the empirical research on international law and human rights: case studies and 
quantitative work based on the country-year as the unit of analysis.  By no means have we 
reached the saturation point with these two approaches, but there are other options that 
researchers should at least keep in mind.  One is experimental research through surveys, which I 
illustrated with the torture question above.  Not only could this method be used to address the 
importance of an international legal commitment, but with larger samples, it could be used to 
compare international to domestic law effects (although, as I have argued, these should be 
thought of as complements rather than competitors for purposes of the mechanisms I discuss in 
Mobilizing).  Another method might be to explore computerized textual analyses for large 
corpuses of comparable documents to look for trends in language and meaning over time.
55  
Textual analysis is quite appropriate for empirical work in a constructivist theoretical vein where 
language and issue framing are crucial to action.  The research discussed above based on State 
Department, European Union and Amnesty International statements is one example.  
It is important to continue research on international law and human rights because the 
claim that the former has had important consequences for the latter is one of the more important 
claims of this century.  It is nonetheless a modest claim.  Mobilizing did not show that 
international law is a magic bullet; nor did it show that it was the most important factor 
influencing human rights worldwide.  As I wrote in that book’s conclusion, the achievement of 
democracy, peace and development would do much on their own to support improved rights 
practices around the world.  None of us should accept the idea that to negotiate and ratify treaties 
is to “do enough” to improve the human condition.  Another aspect of our research should be to 
consider seriously the assertions of those from Eric Posner to David Kennedy, that there is a 
theoretical possibility that law has been accepted as a weak substitute – even a trade-off – for 
real improvements in human welfare.  While most people who have taken this position refuse to 
do the hard empirical work it would take to support it, putting the positive consequences into 
broader policy perspective – including a careful weighing of the costs and consequences of a 
broad range of policy tools – would seem to be the next major research challenge.   As long, 
however, as we do not become complacent that treaties have solved all problems for all time, we 
should continue to support international legal agreements with rhetoric, policy, and action. 
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